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How the FTC Could Beat Google
Robert H. Lande & Jonathan L. Rubin 1
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is rumored to be deciding whether to bring
a “pure Section 5” case against Google as a result of complaints that the company unfairly favors
its own offerings over those of its rivals in its search results. If successful, the case could do more
than improve competition in the crucial multi-billion dollar online marketplace. It also could
revitalize Section 5 of the FTC Act and solidify the agency’s authority to prevent the “unfair
methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” that do not violate the other
Antitrust or Consumer Protection statutes. But the case will fail miserably at the hands of a
reviewing court and the agency will be confined to relatively non-controversial enforcement
violations if the FTC fails to impose upon itself a tightly bounded and constrained legal
framework that contains clear limiting principles.
As former FTC Chairman Bill Kovacic recently warned, an unbounded Section 5 case will
never be sustained by a reviewing court. He is correct. The FTC’s 2008 N-Data settlement, for
example, would have been overturned if it had reached the appellate court because its Section 5
formulation was without constraining principles. There is clear Supreme Court precedent
holding that the FTC Act is broader than the other antitrust laws and covers incipient violations
and conduct violating even the “spirit” of, or policies underlying, the other antitrust laws.
Nevertheless, the only way a court will allow the FTC to pursue a pure Section 5 theory against
Google would be if the agency constrains itself with a coherent principle of competitive harm: the
consumer choice framework.
The consumer choice framework focuses on actual or potential choice in the marketplace
and the key factors necessary for markets to function competitively. This means that any
complaint against Google should expressly declare that Section 5 violations are limited to two
types of conduct:
1. Conduct that does or will significantly restrict or distort the choices available to
consumers, such as incipient exclusive dealing or other exclusionary strategies that
materially restrict the array of alternatives on the market; or
2. Conduct that significantly distorts consumers’ ability freely to choose among the
alternatives the market provides, such as deceptively presented search results.
This approach confines Section 5 within the bounds of the two traditional responsibilities of the
FTC: antitrust law and consumer protection law. Another advantage of a consumer choice
framework, moreover, is that it offers a coherent theory of anticompetitive harm flexible enough
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to accommodate conduct that has elements of both an antitrust violation and a consumer
protection violation.
Under the consumer choice framework, non-price issues that consumers care about—not
just price, but also variety, quality, privacy, and innovation—play a much more prominent role in
the analysis and result. But the key advantage of a consumer choice approach is its limiting
principles. For example, not every decrease in choice qualifies as an injury to competition. Only
significant and material decreases count. Second, more choice is not necessarily good because too
much choice can cause confusion and can, as a practical matter, mean costs increase unduly. The
goal of competition policy should not be to maximize consumer choice, but only to eliminate
practices that artificially restrict the choices the free market would have provided. Third, every
antitrust violation reduces consumer choice, but not every reduction in consumer choice is an
antitrust violation.
Because the evidence against Google amassed by the FTC during its investigation is
confidential we do not know whether the Commission ultimately will decide to pursue a pure
Section 5 case or a traditional antitrust or consumer protection case, or both, against Google. Nor
can we speculate whether a pure Section 5 case would be based upon conduct analogous to
deception (if Google misrepresented the neutrality of its search results), incipient exclusive
dealing (if consumers are unduly influenced but not required to use related Google products), or
some other theory. Indeed, we cannot determine whether the evidence will demonstrate any type
of law violation at all.
Regardless, we urge the FTC to view its task as analogous to that of writing a
Shakespearean sonnet in iambic pentameter, an approach that constrains the poet yet allows her
to achieve greatness. If the Commission instead promulgates an approach to Section 5 that is
insufficiently bounded, or gives it undue discretion, the relatively conservative reviewing courts
of today are certain to dismiss its case against Google, and they might well restrict the scope of
Section 5 to make it coterminous with the other antitrust laws. For the FTC to have any chance
successfully to bring a pure Section 5 case against Google, it must impose upon itself the limits of
the consumer choice framework.
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